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Public concern about personal privacy has recently fo-
cused on issues of Internet data security and personal
information as big business. The scientific discourse
about information privacy focuses on the crosspres-
sures of maintaining confidentiality and ensuring access
in the context of the production of statistical data for
public policy and social research and the associated
technical solutions for releasing statistical data. This
article reports some of the key findings from a small-
scale survey of organizational practices to limit disclo-
sure of confidential information prior to publishing pub-
lic use microdata files, and illustrates how the rules for
preserving confidentiality were applied in practice. Ex-
planation for the apparent deficits and wide variations in
the extent of knowledge about statistical disclosure lim-
itation (SDL) methods is located in theories of organiza-
tional life and communities of practice. The article con-
cludes with suggestions for improving communication
between communities of practice to enhance the knowl-
edge base of those responsible for producing public use
microdata files.
Exemplary survey research practice requires that one
literally do “whatever is possible” to protect the privacy
of research participants and to keep collected informa-
tion they provide confidential or anonymous. (American
Association of Public Opinion Research, 1999, p. 5)
Introduction
More than 30 years of public opinion polls record sig-
nificant concerns about the quantity and use of personal
information collected by government and the private sector
and computer technology whose uses are perceived to di-
minish personal privacy.1 Public anxiety fueled the imple-
mentation of federal and state statutes, regulations, and
administrative policies and guidelines to safeguard privacy
and create enforceable expectations of confidentiality in the
United States, as well as strong data protection laws in
Canada and Western Europe.2
Public attention has recently focused on three intersect-
ing issues: the practices of the U.S. Bureau of the Census
and the 2000 decennial census, Internet data security, and
personal information as big business. The 2000 decennial
census became a highly politicized issue because it re-
quested personal information that was deemed intrusive.3
Lapses in data security have heightened fears that personal
information cannot be protected, and, at the same time, there
is growing public recognition that there are few legal pro-
tections for personal information owned by the private
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1 See Louis Harris Associates and other public opinion data on this
subject, available from the Institute for Research in Social Science, Uni-
versity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill at: http://www.irrs.unc.edu/. For a
summary of 30 years of public opinion polls, see Robbin (2001a).
2 The U.S. Privacy Protection Study Commission’s (1977) publication,
Personal Privacy in an Information Society remains the seminal document
for evaluating government’s role in personal and information privacy. Alan
Westin should be acknowledged as a key agent in alerting the public to the
risks of computer technology and loss of personal privacy (Westin, 1971,
1976a, 1976b; Westin & Baker, 1972). Western European countries have
strong data protection, which the United States does not have (see Bennett,
1997, 1998; Bennett & Raab, 1997; Cate, 1997; European Commission,
1997; Perrine, 2000).
3 There was extensive press coverage of the decennial census and its
intrusiveness (e.g., Norman, 2000; Rosenbaum, 2000), which was also
examined by various researchers, including Martin (2000), Nie & Junn
(2000), Nie, Junn, and Slotwiner (2000), and Robbin (2001a, 2001b).
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sector.4 Indeed, the American Society for Information Sci-
ence and Technology’s (1997, p. 2) Bulletin has, for exam-
ple, reflected on the “difficulties in maintaining both the
integrity of our data and personal and corporate privacy
[that] are growing by orders of magnitude.”
Politics, law, and policy on privacy and confidentiality,
Internet security breaches, and the misuse of personal in-
formation by e-commerce firms have also had far-reaching
consequences for government’s statistical activities and the
social science enterprise.5 Statutory protections with civil
and criminal penalties make government agencies and re-
searchers accountable for protecting information about hu-
man subjects and corporate entities.6 At the same time,
however, law and policy recognize that individuals do not
have “complete authority to control whether and on what
terms they participate in [civil society, corporate life], and
socially important research” (Mackie & Bradburn, 2000, p.
20). Statutes and executive agency regulations also permit
the release of data under restricted use conditions that
protect the confidentiality of records, when justified as nec-
essary for the conduct of scientific discovery and for in-
formed public policy.7
The scientific discourse about the issues of privacy,
confidentiality, and the release of data addresses the cross
pressures of maintaining confidentiality, and ensuring
access in the context of the production of statistical data for
public policy and social research (Cox, 1991; Duncan, Jab-
ine, & de Wolf, 1993; Duncan & Pearson, 1991a, 1991b;
Kruskal, 1981; Norwood, 1991; Fienberg, Martin, & Straf,
1985). Maximizing the two privileged but competing social
values of data protection and data access has led to a large
corpus of published research on statistical disclosure limi-
tation and confidentiality-preserving statistical methods by
statisticians in Western Europe and North America. This
research, some of which is discussed in this article, has
made it possible to release public use files that serve as the
foundation for social science research and public policy.
The decision-making process for producing public use
files that preserve confidentiality remains, however, more or
less invisible to the general public. We lack empirical evi-
dence about the cross pressures experienced by technical
staff and the ways in which the public debate on privacy and
confidentiality influences the technical decisions about the
production and release of public use files. What the rules
regarding disclosure risk mean and how they are used by
people in the context of bureaucratic work have generally
been ignored as an empirical issue. This article seeks to fill
a gap in our knowledge base about organizational decisions
to produce public use files that contain person information
and also contributes to a small corpus of research that
investigates how “back office,” mostly invisible information
technology workers do their work (Clement, 1994; Star,
1991; Suchman, 1996).
We report findings from a small-scale survey of the
methods used by government agencies and private sector
survey research organizations to limit disclosure of confi-
dential information prior to publishing public use microdata
files and the cross pressures that members of these organi-
zations experienced in releasing or denying access to sta-
tistical data.8 A key finding of this organizational practices
survey was that people responsible for preparing data files
that contained potential risks for disclosing the identity of
subjects appeared to have taken few precautions for limiting
disclosure. This finding was unexpected, because extensive
research has been carried out to devise techniques that
minimize risks, and a large published literature on the
subject exists.
The finding led the authors to a central research question:
“What prevented these organizations and their information
managers from having received ‘state of the art’ information
about statistical disclosure risk and methods to limit that
risk.” Put another way, why does knowledge “out there” not
get used and incorporated into organizational practice? The
explanation employs theories of organizational behavior
and communities of practice to explore a variety of organi-
zational contingencies, especially those internal to organi-
zations, such as local work practices, cultures, complexity,
and other barriers to useful and important statistical data.
4 U.S. Department of Commerce (1999); U.S. Federal Trade Commis-
sion (1998, 2000); Clausing (2000); Americans facing loss of personal
privacy (2000); Frishberg (2000); McCullagh and Morehead (2000); Ca-
ruso (1999); Okie (2000); Mosaquera (2000).
5 They also have had significant effects on private and corporate
decision making. Martin’s (1998) study of employment trends in the
information services and technology sectors shows indirectly how corpo-
rate decisions about information technology infrastructure building, R&D
investments, expansion of training programs, wage and salary structures,
and global competitiveness depend on the analysis of statistical data that
are collected at the level of the individually identifiable firm and individual.
Martin’s analysis rests on data that are released as “public use” (that is,
made available to the public) “microdata” or summary tabulation (aggre-
gated microlevel data) files.
6 For example, the Privacy Act of 1974, the Computer Security Act of
1987, and the National Education Statistics Act of 1994 direct the National
Center for Education Statistics and their contractors to protect confidential
data (McMillen, 1999).
7 One example of administrative rules that permit the release of indi-
vidually identifiable information pertains to the Health Care Financing
Administration. “[Medicare entitlement, utilization, and payment data]
may be released . . . (4) To an individual or organization for a research,
evaluation, or epidemiological project related to the prevention of disease
or disability . . . if HCFA: . . . (b) Determines that the purpose for which the
disclosure is to be made: (1) Cannot be reasonably accomplished unless the
record is provided in individually identifiable form; (2) Is of sufficient
importance to warrant the effect and/or risk on the privacy of the individual
that additional exposure of the record might bring . . .”(U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, 1992, p. 53763).
8 This survey was originally carried out to provide background infor-
mation for an October 1999 workshop sponsored by the Committee on
National Statistics (CNStat) of the National Research Council (Mackie &
Bradburn, 2000; Robbin & Koball, 2000; Robbin, Koball, & Jabine, 1999).
The summary of recommendations that resulted from our survey is pub-
lished in Mackie and Bradburn (2000). We would like to acknowledge
Thomas Jabine, who has played a central role in federal statistical activities
regarding data confidentiality and data sharing and served as consultant for
this survey.
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Part 1 introduces the concepts of public use microdata
files and statistical disclosure limitation (SDL) methods,
and provides examples of how disclosure risk is evaluated.
The section serves both to show the ways in which disclo-
sure risk is evaluated by statisticians and to provide the
supporting evidence for our conclusion that most of the
organizations we surveyed did not employ SDL procedures
prior to releasing longitudinal public data files. The section
is also useful for database designers and developers of data
mining tools, who work with large amounts of personal
information. Part 2 explains how the Survey of SDL Orga-
nizational Practices was conducted. The strategy for draw-
ing the sample of microdata files is discussed, but the names
of data files are not revealed to protect the confidentiality of
the respondents and their organizations. Part 3 reports how
the rules about preserving confidentiality were applied in
practice by our respondents, including how their decisions
contributed to disclosure risk, how they interpreted the rules
about maintaining confidentiality of personally identifiable
information, and how the environment they operated in
contributed to a general lack of knowledge about SDL
techniques.
Part 4 discusses the findings in the context of seeking an
explanation for the apparent deficits and wide variations in
the extent of knowledge about SDL methods. We apply
theories of work life in large-scale complex organizations
and the role that knowledge plays in creating and sustaining
communities of practice. We conclude by restating how
theory was critical to understanding organizational commu-
nication failures and also offers guidance for improving
communication between communities of practice to en-
hance the knowledge base of people responsible for the
production of public use microdata files. Tables 1 and 2
identify the major statistical disclosure limitation techniques
and definitions, and administrative procedures for restrict-
ing access to microdata files and definitions, respectively.
Appendix 1 contains a facsimile of the SDL Organizational
Practices Survey questionnaire. Appendix 2 describes the
characteristics of and conditions for access to the microdata
files that were part of this survey.
Reducing Disclosure Risk in Public Use
Longitudinal Microdata Files
Public use files distributed by government and the social
research community are considered a major scientific inno-
vation that has proved to be an effective solution for bal-
ancing the “often conflicting goals of preserving confiden-
tiality and exploiting the research potential of microdata”
(Mackie & Bradburn, 2000, p. 1). The demographer Ste-
phen Ruggles has written an assessment of the best known
of the public use microdata files, the 1940 through 1990
decennial census Public Use Microdata Survey (PUMS)
files, that can be extended to other public use microdata
files: PUMS files “revolutionized the analysis of the Amer-
ican population;” and led to “an explosion of census-based
Table 1. Statistical disclosure limitation techniques and definitions.
Statistical disclosure limitation techniques Definitions
Collecting or Releasing a Sample of Data Releasing subsamples of larger data sets. For example, the Census Bureau releases
a sample of census data as public-use microdata.
Including Simulated Data
Multiple Imputation1 Using multiple imputation techniques to create a simulated data set with the same
statistical properties as an original data set.
Blurring Data, Grouping, or Adding Random Error
Top-Coding
Bottom-Coding Grouping extreme high values into one category.
Intervals Grouping extreme low values into one category.
Noise Introduction Grouping continuous, unique values into broader intervals
Blurring Introducing random error into data
Microaggregation Replacing a reported value with an average value for a subgroup.
Grouping records based on a proximity measure of all variables of interest, and
calculating aggregates for those variables.
Excluding Certain Attributes
Deleting Identifiers Deleting unique identifiers, such as day of birth.
Dropping Sensitive Variables Dropping particularly sensitive variables, such as HIV-status from public-use
microdata sets.
Blank and Impute Selecting records at random, blanking out selected variables and imputing for them.
Swapping Data
Record Swapping Selecting a sample of the records, finding a match in the data base on a set of
predetermined variables and swapping all other variables.
Rank Swapping A way of using continuous variables to define pairs of records for swapping;
instead of variables matching exactly, they can be close.
Sources: Duncan et al., 1993; U.S. Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology, 1994, July 1999.
1Imputation refers to procedures for assigning values to unreported items, as a way to minimize nonresponse, inconsistent, or unacceptable codes. The
same procedures may be used to protect confidentiality. For more information on applications, see U.S. Bureau of the Census publications, such as the
Technical Documentation released from the 1990 decennial census (Appendix C. Accuracy of the Data) available at: http://www.census.gov
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research” and to the PUMS as “the mainstay of American
social science” (Task Force, 2000, p. 1).
Many complex policy issues can only be understood with
longitudinal or panel survey data (Boruch & Pearson, 1985).
Mackie and Bradburn (2000) discuss how these types of
data “facilitate a broad spectrum of research [that] shed[s]
light on . . . questions that could not otherwise be reliably
conducted” (p. 6) when they are linked to “health, eco-
nomic, contextual [e.g., unemployment rates], geographic,
and employer information” (p. 2).9 They also explain that
linking survey data and administrative records, such as
social security earnings, unemployment compensation,
medicare benefits, hospital records, or student transcripts,
can be an efficient solution to the high costs of data pro-
duction because linkage “reduce[s] the need to duplicate
survey activities, reduce data collection and processing, and
improve data quality” (p. 6).
Individual-level sample data from the decennial census,
as well as other national probability samples, which repre-
sent a very small fraction of the population can be released
after sensitive data are deleted, and minimal detail on ge-
ography is provided to protect the confidentiality of respon-
dents. Statistical methods designed to limit disclosure risk
and administrative rules that provide access under con-
trolled conditions offer a theoretical framework and practi-
cal solutions, respectively, for balancing these conflicting
values. Tables 1 and 2 summarize some of the solutions
applied by data producers to release or permit access to
microdata files, and general approaches to reducing disclo-
sure risk are discussed in the next section.
The stewardship of statistical data for policy and re-
search remains a problematic issue, however. At the same
time that public use microdata files, including longitudinal
and panel studies, have become an essential tool for con-
ducting scholarly research and public policy, their release
always entails some risk of disclosure and, therefore, po-
tential harm to respondents.10 There never exists a condition
of zero risk, which statisticians recognize as “an impossibly
high standard”; and, moreover, “collection of any data en-
tails some sort of risk, no matter how small” (American
Statistical Association, 1999a, p. 1; U.S. Federal Committee
on Statistical Methodology, 1994).
9 For examples of this type of research, see Duncan and Pearson
(1991). There is a long history of discussion about the contribution that
social science makes to public policy, some of which is available in Weiss
(1977a, 1977b); National Research Council (1979); National Science
Board (1969); McAdams, Smelser, & Treimar (1982); U.S. House Com-
mittee on Government Operations, Legislation and National Security
(1982); and Martin and Straf (1985).
10 The ways that disclosure of a person’s identity may occur are
summarized by the U.S. Federal Statistical Committee on Methodology
(1994, p. 1): “Disclosure occurs when information that is meant to be
treated as confidential is revealed. Sometimes disclosure can occur based
on the released data alone; sometimes disclosure results from combination
of the released data with publicly available information; and sometimes
disclosure is possible only through combination of the released data with
detailed external data sources that may or may not be available to the
general public.”
Table 2. Administrative procedures for restricting access to microdata files and definitions.
Administrative Procedures Definitions
Special Employee Arrangements Giving a person who does not work for an agency or
organization special status to access confidential data,
such as having special sworn-in status.
Restricted Locations of Access Restricting data access and analysis to an on-site location.
Modes of Data Transmittal Releasing encrypted data with software that can produce
descriptive statistics from the encrypted data.
Off-Site Physical Security Measures Requiring off-site data users to safeguard access to
restricted data.
Oaths and Written Agreements Signing an agreement between the data collection
organization or agency and the data user. This
agreement often specifies the intended use of the data
and the individuals who have access to the data.
Penalties Imposing penalties for the release of confidential data.
Penalties can range from denying further access to data
to imprisonment for the release of Title 13 census data.
Disclosure Review Board Formally constituted agency unit tasked with evaluating
the risk of disclosure, comprised of representatives of
the department’s statistical staff, subject specialists,
and, for National Center for Education Statistics, a
representative of the Bureau of the Census. Producers
of public use files complete a form that provides
general rules about geographic information and the
contents, in order to determine whether there is an
unusual risk of individual disclosure.
Sources: Jabine, T. B. (1993); McMillen (1999, p. 3). U.S. Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology
(1999).
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Statisticians have demonstrated that access to the records
of the original population (or universe) creates the condi-
tions for verifying identification of members of the sample,
although identification requires a high level of computa-
tional and statistical literacy to verify or confirm the identity
of a particular individual (Bethlehem, Keller, & Pannekok,
1989; Kim & Winkler, 1995; Winkler, 1997, 1998). Releas-
ing a sample as a public use file and making unavailable the
original population/universe data greatly reduces the risk of
disclosure, although disclosure is never completely elimi-
nated because full information on all possible risks is not
available (see Simon, 1979/1955 on “bounded rationality”).
We do know, however, that the possibility for inadvertent
disclosure is magnified when these files contain detailed
characteristics of respondents. Identity also becomes more
vulnerable to disclosure when data for respondents who
participate in long-term research investigations are linked to
administrative records of government agencies.
Yet it is this detailed information, longevity of data
collection, and the linkage to other types of information that
enhance the research potential of the data. Conversely, the
less data accessible for analysis, the lower utility for re-
search and public policy. Thus, the core issue for data
distributors of public use files is: how much risk will be
tolerated, so that public use files protect confidentiality but
are not too stringent to constrain the utility of the data.
General Approaches to Reduce Disclosure Risk
Two general approaches, restricted data and restricted
access—statistical techniques and administrative proce-
dures, respectively—have been utilized to protect the pri-
vacy and confidentiality of respondent information and pro-
vide access to statistical data (Duncan, in press; Duncan et
al., 1993; Feinberg & Willenborg, 1998; Sullivan, 1992;
U.S. Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology, 1978,
1994, 1999).11
Restricted data applies constraints on access to the con-
tent of data sets or files to be released in microdata files.
Content is restricted by such methods as removing explicit
identifiers; reducing information by creating intervals,
grouping or bounding permitted values (top or bottom cod-
ing); recoding variables; deleting sensitive variables; sup-
pressing values in a cell; injecting random error; or releas-
ing only a sample of the data (e.g., 18% sample of the 1990
Census). These techniques are called “data conditioned
methods” (Duncan, 2001, p. 9). Another type of disclosure
limitation method substitutes one sample of data for an-
other, known as “synthetic” data (see Kennickell, 1999a,
1999b); although the risk of identity disclosure is eliminated
with the latter approach, the risk of attribute disclosure may
be possible (Duncan, 2001, p. 10). Table 1 summarizes the
various methods and their definitions.
Restricted access imposes “conditions on who may have
access to agency [or organization] data, for what purpose, at
what locations, and so forth” (Duncan et al., 1993, p. 142).
Government agencies recognize that compliance with con-
fidentiality requirements might severely curtail the “amount
of detail included in statistical summaries or microdata sets
intended for unrestricted access, [and] such limitations in-
evitably limit the scope and depth of analytical uses of the
data” (Jabine, 1993, p. 538). Specified written and enforce-
able contractual agreements define the responsibilities of the
researcher. Table 2 summarizes these procedures and their
definitions. For more discussion on restricted access proce-
dures that government agencies have applied, see the sum-
maries in Jabine (1993), Mackie and Bradburn (2000), and
the American Statistical Association (1999b).
Example of Assessment of Statistical Disclosure Risk
The evaluation of disclosure risk in the National Educa-
tion Longitudinal Study of 1988 (NELS) illustrates the steps
that analysts took to reduce disclosure risk prior to devel-
oping public use files for cross-sectional and longitudinal
surveys. The NELS provides both public use and restricted
use files that are longitudinal surveys of high school stu-
dents. Some of the data in the public use files have been
altered or suppressed, whereas the “restricted use” files
“preserve the original data free of all confidentiality edits”
(Ingels, Dowd, Baldride, Stipe, Bartot, & Frankel, 1994a, p.
1). The latter are available through the National Center for
Education Statistics data licensing system (see McMillen,
1999).
This example illustrates the statistical methods that are
available, but it is also important to recognize that applica-
tion of appropriate statistical disclosure limitation (SDL)
methods is a function of the type of data, their detail, and
anticipated uses because a general set of rules governing
releases is not possible. Jabine (1993, p. 542) comments,
“Virtually every proposed release of a new data set differs
in some relevant way from other releases, even within the
same agency and program (see also Mackie & Bradburn,
2000, p. 41).
The NELS statistical program reflects the mandate of the
Department of Education National Center for Education
Statistics (NCES) to “collect and disseminate statistical and
other data related to education in the United States” and “to
conduct and publish reports on specific analyses of the
meaning and significance of these statistics.” The NELS
study is part of a program that now spans three decades. The
program began in the early 1970s with a cohort of students
in the Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972
(NLS-72), which was then followed by a second cohort
designed to study developments during the 1980s, High
School and Beyond (HS&B). NELS examines develop-
ments during the 1990s and beyond that, and is designed to
11 This discussion on statistical disclosure risk focuses only individual
units of analysis that are individual persons or households. There are
important and very difficult issues concerning confidentiality for establish-
ment (firm)/institutional units because there are fewer establishments,
publicly available data, and greater motivation to identify firms (see Dun-
can & Pearson, 1991b, p. 238; Duncan et al., 1993; Norwood, 1991).
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“develop and examine federal education policy,” with data
provided on the “educational, vocational, and personal de-
velopment of students at various grade levels, and the per-
sonal, familial, social, institutional, cultural factors that may
affect development” (Ingels et al., 1994a, pp. 7, 1–2). Public
use files from all three cohorts have been very widely
disseminated, and the corpus of research is substantial.
NELS is a nationally representative sample of eighth-
grade schools and students achieved by a two-stage strati-
fied probability sample design (Ingels et al., 1994a, p. 7).12
The technical report explains that NELS was designed “to
address multiple research and policy objectives” (p. 6). The
“major features” of the study are “supplementary compo-
nents to support analyses of geographically or demograph-
ically distinct subgroups” and “linkages to previous longi-
tudinal studies and other current studies” (p. 6).
Three types of analyses can be carried out: “cross-wave,
cross-sectional at a single point in time, and cross-cohort by
comparing the NELS cohort to cohorts in the NLS-72 and
HS&B” (Ingels et al., 1994a, p. 6). The longitudinal (“cross-
wave”) feature provides researchers with the capability of
studying the students’ educational and professional attain-
ment. The cross-cohort capability means that “comparisons
can be drawn with previous NCES longitudinal studies” (p.
7), and trend analysis can be carried out. Some of the NELS
content is also contained in the NLS-72 and the HS&B
studies. A core set of data is continued, but NELS is also
designed to incorporate new research and policy questions
(see Owings, 2000, as well as other NCES publications on
the objectives of the NELS study).
NELS includes assessment and transcript records on the
students and also follows students who drop out of school.
The longitudinal data are “augmented through parent,
teacher, school administrator (questionnaires were adminis-
tered), and school record accounts of students’ progress and
development,” that are designed to understand their “prob-
lems and concerns, relationships with parents, peers, and
teachers, and the characteristics of their schools” (Ingels et
al., 1994a, p. 6).
The technical reports summarize the extensive disclosure
risk analysis of the NELS data. The researchers identified
“items of information, used alone, in conjunction with other
variables, or in conjunction with public external sources
such as school universe files” to ensure that no institution’s
or individual’s identity could be disclosed (Ingels et al.,
1994a, p. 13). Variables were suppressed or altered if they
posed significant disclosure risks (p. 14). A two-step eval-
uation took place to examine disclosure risk, first, on each
of the cross-sectional files and, then, on the longitudinal
data (base data and followups). For example, for “an ex-
tremely small number of schools” (p. 113), eight variables
were suppressed, including race, ethnicity, region, any value
over 10 for family size (recoded to 10). Thirteen parent
component variables were also altered, including identifiers,
residential location, race, ethnicity, region, and family size
(fn, p. 113).
Cross-sectional Disclosure Risk Analysis
The researchers “pre-identified those variables deemed
high risk because they ‘constituted virtually unique data
signatures,’ such as continuous variables, extreme outliers,
and ‘finer-grain versions of school-level’” information (In-
gels et al., 1994b, p. 113). High risk continuous variables
were recoded as categorical variables. Detailed categorical
variables were recoded into larger categories. An institution
or student might be coded as “missing, coded to an adjacent
category, or included in a code which collapsed two or more
response categories” in the public use files, if either the
institution or student could be “characterized in terms of a
single variable in the original data” (Ingels et al., 1994a, p.
14).
The researchers analyzed potential disclosure risk for
school level information because school-universe files are
publicly available (Ingels et al., 1994b, pp. 114–115). The
“Common Core of Data” (CCD) is the Department of Ed-
ucation’s primary database on public elementary and sec-
ondary education in the United States, containing compre-
hensive information for approximately 90,000 schools and
about 16,000 school districts (approximately 16,000).13
Quality Education Data (QED) is a for-profit research and
database company, whose “National Education Database”
covers U.S. and Canadian educational institutions. QED
also maintains a “National Registry of Teacher Names”
12 NELS has five components: a sample of students who were eighth
graders in 1988 and are followed up at 2-year intervals. The N for the
original sample (base year) of participants is 24,599 (Ingels et al., 1994a,
p. 7; 1994b, p. 116). A total number of 1,252 schools contributed usable
data in the base year 1988. The original sample is augmented in subsequent
data collections to maintain the national representativeness of the grade-
specific cohort (e.g., the original sample of eighth graders who are now
sophomores is representative of a national cohort of sophomores). The
study now incorporates the base data collected in 1988 and four follow-ups
(1990, 1992, 1994, 2000). For more information on the NELS, see http://
nces.ed.gov/surveys/nels88/.
13 The quantity of publicly available information about elementary and
secondary schools is so extensive that it greatly increases disclosure risk
and, thus, accounts for the very careful disclosure risk assessment that the
Ingels team carried out. The U.S. National Center for Education Statistics
annually collects detailed information on all public elementary and sec-
ondary schools in the United States, which originate from five surveys sent
to the 50 state education departments. The information is then published in
the NCES’s “Common Core of Data” (CCD) (for more detail, see http://
nces.ed.gov/ccd/aboutccd.html). For example, the school district level in-
formation includes phone number; location and type of agency; current
number of students; and number of high school graduates and completers
in the previous year. State-level aggregated information includes the num-
ber of students by grade level; full-time equivalent staff by major employ-
ment category; and high school graduates and completers in the previous
year. State-level fiscal information is also reported, including average daily
attendance; school district revenues by source (local, state, federal); and
expenditures by function (instruction, support services, and noninstruction)
and subfunction (school administration, etc). The school district level fiscal
data describe revenues by source and expenditures by function and sub-
function, and enrollment.
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database of teacher, curriculum and school data “gathered
directly from teachers and administrators.”14
The analysts identified 10 variables that were in both the
NELS and QED database and seven variables in both the
NELS and CCD. They constructed a “code distance metric”
to calculate the distance between schools on selected vari-
ables.15 If their analysis of school matches showed that
institutional identity could be deductively disclosed, then
they made more changes to school-, student- or teacher-
level variables (p. 113). They also had to assure that the
“abridgements, recategorization, and maskings made for
confidentiality purposes on school data” were applied to the
student records (p. 113).
The NELS:88-QED assessment yielded 98 schools
that were at risk of disclosure, or 7.8 percent of the
sample schools (98/1252). The researchers then applied
methods to further reduce the risk of disclosure “to an
acceptable level” (Ingels et al., 1994b, p. 114). They
removed the “percent Black” and “percent Hispanic”
variables, but kept the “percent White” so that “percent
minority could be calculated by subtraction” (p. 114).
The variables “percent White, percent free lunch, and
number of teachers” were recoded into larger categories.
They dropped the “school industrial arts” or “special
education course” variables. The number of schools at
risk of disclosure were then reduced to 36. They then
recoded values and/or set values to missing for these
specific variables for these 36 schools.
They also altered certain variables depending on their
“analytic importance.” These included: “number of teach-
ers,” “total school enrollment,” “percent White,” and “per-
cent free lunch” because these variables are available in
other public databases. The variables “grade span” and
“urbanicity” were altered only if the researchers could be
assured that disclosure was not at risk after making changes
in the other variables. They coded “grade span” and “eth-
nicity” variables as “missing,” instead of altering their val-
ues. Distortion was minimized by “moving schools up or
down by no more than one category, after examining the
distance in their scores in relation to other schools close to
them” (Ingels et al., 1994b, p. 114).
Then the researchers assessed these changes to the
NELS:88 data file against the Common Core Data (CCD),
except no stratification by school type was required because
the CCD only contains public schools. The same method-
ology used for the NELS:88-QED evaluation was employed
with the CCD data. No schools were found to be at risk
(Ingels et al., 1994b, p. 115).
Longitudinal Disclosure Risk Analysis
Disclosure risk increases as more data about an entity are
collected. Ingels and colleagues state that the possibilities
become more likely when the base-year and first and second
follow-up data are used “in combination to identify a
school” (Ingels et al.,1994b, p. 115). The authors took three
measures to address the risk of disclosure in the longitudinal
files (base year, first, and second follow-ups). The confi-
dentiality edits performed for the base-year were main-
tained. They created “an independent set of randomized
school identification number for the first follow-up
schools,” to make it difficult to match base year and first
follow-up schools by using only the school files (p. 115).
They conclude, however, that identity could “still be ac-
complished by analysis and deduction” (p. 115). Student
records can be used to match base-year and first follow-up
schools.
They then conducted an “exploratory analysis of feeder
patterns on 20 first follow-up schools, utilizing only the
QED school list” (p. 115). Sixteen schools were subse-
quently eliminated because they did not meet various crite-
ria [e.g., “no feeder schools with at least three students or 10
or more schools closer to it than it was to itself, no feeder
schools that matched themselves within the top five
matches” (p. 116)]. Subsequent case study analysis on the
schools led the researchers to conclude that “in no case was
the signature of the first follow up/base year feeder pair so
distinctive as to be absolutely unique” (p. 116).
Summary: Utility of Statistical Disclosure Limitation
(SDL) Research
Statistical disclosure limitation research contributes im-
portant knowledge of the probabilities of disclosure, pro-
viding information about how data can be “transformed so
that their release adequately lowers disclosure risk” (Dun-
can, in press, p. 1). The caveat is that there will be tradeoffs:
the more severe the masking, the less useful the informa-
tion; and, indeed, some techniques may “introduce bias in
the inferences that are drawn” (Duncan et al., 1993, p. 147).
This concern led the Ingels team to assess disclosure risk in
light of the analytical potential of the data. The key lies in
good decision making that depends on the scientific evalu-
ation of risk. Assessments must be made of the disclosure
risk and the constraints to be imposed on the data, so that
confidentiality can be assured with a high degree of proba-
bility for the release of public use microdata files.
Survey of Organizational SDL Practices:
Methodology, Data Collection, and Evaluation
of Data Quality
The SDL practices survey that was conducted to provide
background information for a National Research Council
Committee on National Statistics workshop on confidenti-
ality and data access. This survey focused on public use
microdata sets with longitudinal data, linked administrative
14 See QED Web site at: http://www.qeddata.com/aboutqed.htm.
15 The code distance metric is “defined as the sum of the absolute
values of the NELS/QED code differences for respective variables.” There
had to be at least three schools closer to the sample school for the sample
school not to be considered at risk (Ingels et al., 1994b, p. 114).
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data, or contextual data because these data files face special
risks to deductive disclosure. A microdata file consists of
records at the respondent level. Each record contains values
of variables for a person, household, establishment, or other
unit (U.S. Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology,
1999). “Longitudinal” or “panel” surveys are “repeated
observations of the same person or other units through time”
(Boruch & Pearson, 1985, p. 2). “Linked administrative
data” were defined as data that could be obtained from
administrative sources (e.g., Social Security Records) and
linked to survey data through some unique identifier (e.g.,
Social Security Number). “Contextual data” are defined as
characteristics (e.g., unemployment rates) of small areas
(e.g., counties).
There was no practical way to construct a complete
enumeration of public use microdata sets that contain lon-
gitudinal, administrative, or contextual data, nor was there
any intention of generalizing to a hypothetical universe of
in-scope microdata sets. Instead, the principal goal was to
obtain an understanding of the statistical disclosure limita-
tion (SDL) practices of organizations that have released
major public use microdata sets whose sample units are
potentially at risk of disclosure. Although not its primary
purpose, the SDL survey also revealed the extent to which
administrative procedures to provide access under con-
trolled conditions were used by our respondents (see Mas-
sell, 1999, for a summary of administrative practices).
Various procedures were employed to gather informa-
tion, including a mailout–mailback questionnaire of open-
ended questions, follow-up written and telephone conver-
sations, and Web-based searches for documents that de-
scribed the both microdata files and procedures for releasing
public use files. The multiple methods were necessary to
clarify and verify the meaning of the information received
from the respondents (see Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, on
“triangulation”).
Case Selection and Screening Criteria and Procedures
The first step in information gathering was to sample
public use microdata sets that contained longitudinal, linked
administrative, or contextual data. The sampling frame con-
sisted of studies identified in two National Academy Press
publications, Data on America’s Aging Population (Carr,
Penmarzao, & Rice, 1996) and Longitudinal Surveys of
Children (West, Hauser, & Scanlan, 1998) that focus on
currently available public use microdata for the studies of
the elderly and of children, broadly defined, conducted in
North America. During the information-gathering stage,
several additional surveys were also identified by National
Research Council staff and the survey respondents, for a
total sample of 20 data files.
A contact person who was most familiar with the data set
was identified within each organization through the docu-
mentation on the data file. Generally, these contact people
were principal investigators or data managers. The person
within the organization most familiar with issues of data
confidentiality was then identified. We received information
from or had communication with more than 25 people
during the period of data collection. These respondents are
analogous to “informants” who report on practices that are
carried out in their organization in an “intrinsic” or “instru-
mental” (Stake, 1994) qualitative case study (on case study
methodology and qualitative research in organizations more
generally, see Berg, 1998; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; Yin,
1989, 1993).
Background information on these respondents was lim-
ited to the title and unit in which the individual was located
because the survey concentrated on organizational prac-
tices. Information on “title” was obtained for 23 respon-
dents, who included project directors and managers; princi-
pal investigators; researchers, programmer, and systems an-
alysts; directors of survey operations; survey statisticians;
senior methodologists or economists; a chief of information
management systems; and a vice president for research.
Because follow-up conversations were necessary, we were
sometimes able to obtain additional information about
length of tenure in the position for some of our respondents,
as well as more detailed information about the work units
involved in the production of the public use files that sup-
plemented our own knowledge about these organizations.
The data collection organizations whose microdata files
met the SDL survey study criteria included government
statistical agencies (n 5 3), nonprofit firms (n 5 9), and
university-based research units (n 5 8). These organiza-
tional units are embedded in complex institutional settings,
and all have complex formal interorganizational arrange-
ments that are a consequence of the funding of data collec-
tion as well as activities related to the production of longi-
tudinal microdata files. These structural arrangements
sometimes meant that we were referred to additional people
on the project staff after our initial contacts, and they
explain why the total N of microdata files is smaller than the
total number of individuals with whom we spoke.
Questionnaire on SDL Organizational Practices
A questionnaire was designed to elicit information on
SDL practices (see Appendix 1). Part 1 of the questionnaire
requested identifying information about the respondent, or-
ganization, and microdata set. Part 2 asked the respondent a
series of open-ended questions about SDL practices. This
second part was subdivided into sections by type of public
use data: longitudinal, linked administrative, or contextual.
Information was obtained on the units of analysis; major
categories of data; some of the key variables; reference
dates or periods for these variables; whether any of these
variables presented special disclosure risks; what proce-
dures were used to reduce the risks; and “any special prob-
lems” associated with persons or households that moved
between waves of the survey or entered or left the sample
for other reasons. Questions on administrative record link-
age obtained information on units of analysis and variables
included in the public use files; source(s) of the administra-
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tive data; assessment of statistical disclosure risk presented
by the linkage; and procedures had been applied to prevent
disclosure. Questions on contextual data included a descrip-
tion of the geographic areas; types of variables; level of
detail for these areas; precautions taken to ensure confiden-
tiality; any other issues concerning SDL procedures; and
reasons for using a particular SDL method(s).
Data Collection
In May and June 1999, a cover letter that described the
purpose of the study and the questionnaire were either
mailed or e-mailed to the correct contact person for each of
the 16 microdata sets that had been initially selected. A
reminder e-mail or phone call was sent if there were no
response within a month. The one nonresponse occurred
because the organization’s funding was in transition, and the
principal investigator reported that no one was available to
answer questions about data confidentiality; however, we
were able to gather limited descriptive information about
this microdata set through their Web site. By the end of the
data collection period, four additional data sets had been
identified and information on a total of 20 microdata sets
that met the study criteria had been gathered.
These 20 longitudinal microdata files contain detailed
portraits of individuals, families, and households. Sample
sizes range from about 5,000 to nearly 60,000 respondents.
The data files are both comprehensive and sensitive. The
amount of detail on individuals and households is extensive
and grows significantly with every round of data collection.
Several microdata sets have accumulated information on
their respondents for more than 30 years. In most cases,
these files contain thousands of variables. They include
consumption behavior, income and earnings, health status,
employment histories, eligibility for government programs,
and transitions in the life course. A number of the longitu-
dinal surveys also link survey data to administrative data.
These administrative data include, for example, school
records, doctor and hospital visits, and earnings, some of
which derive from administrative records that are public
information. Most of the microdata files contain a minimal
amount of contextual/geographic data.
Information gathering through open-ended question-
naires and inside organizations is a messy business, filled
with uncertainty and requiring continual evaluation of the
information. In an iterative fashion, nearly always through a
time-consuming and sometimes frustrating dialogue be-
tween researcher and respondents, the complexity of orga-
nizational life begins to unfold.16 The SDL survey followed
this trajectory. This process of data collection sheds light on
how these organizations made decisions about releasing
data and the distribution of knowledge about statistical
disclosure risk.
There was considerable variation in the completeness of
responses to the questionnaires. Some of the responses were
detailed and clear, while others were brief, vague, or incom-
plete and required clarification. Sometimes questions were
misunderstood. Some respondents appeared more familiar
with data confidentiality terminology and concepts than
others and provided us with the type of information that we
expected. Those who were unfamiliar with the concepts
provided answers that were not focused on the issues that
the SDL survey investigated.
The scope of the information gathering process was
enlarged for follow-up data collection. Data confidentiality
issues that had not been part of the original questionnaire
were identified, including more detailed information on the
SDL techniques applied to income data; more information
on restricted access data that were linked to the public use
microdata sets; and more information on the sampling pro-
cedures used by organizations. Web site searches were
conducted for all the microdata sets to supplement the
information received through the questionnaires. The study
staff recontacted respondents for more information.
Sometimes there were errors in the responses. For ex-
ample, the questionnaire asked how the organization linked
administrative data to their microdata sets, but respondents
often supplied information about how the data user could
link the administrative records to the microdata sets. It was
very difficult to obtain useful answers about contextual data.
Most respondents reported that their data sets contained no
contextual data; this response may, however, reflect confu-
sion over the meaning of contextual data. In at least one
case, for example, our review of the data set’s documenta-
tion indicated that the microdata set contained contextual
data, although the respondent reported that the data set did
not.17
Statistical Disclosure Limitation Practices Inside
Organizations
The three categories of data that the SDL Organizational
Practices Survey focused on present well-known disclosure
risks. Nineteen of the 20 data sets identified in our study had
publicly available longitudinal data. Only one organization
had restricted access to its longitudinal data file, because the
combination of sensitive data on the respondent’s behavior
and rules for participation in this survey made these data
particularly vulnerable to disclosure risks. (See Appendix 2
for a description of the characteristics of and conditions for
access to these microdata files.)
16 For a discussion of the difficulties of conducting organizational
surveys, see Rosenfeld, Edwards, and Thomas (1993). Yin’s (1989, 1993)
texts on the case study method and Zimmerman’s (1970) analyses of
bureaucratic life provide useful discussions about conducting case study
analysis of organizational behavior.
17 It should be noted that cognitive pretesting of the questionnaire was
not conducted. It may have revealed the extent to which people had
familiarity with the language and concepts of statistical disclosure limita-
tion techniques.
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How Organizations Applied Statistical Disclosure
Techniques
Identifying information, such as “names,” “addresses,”
and “social security numbers,” was deleted from the public
use microdata files, except in one case. In general, variables
such as “age” and “income” were top-coded (see more
discussion below). In many cases, linked administrative
data were either suppressed, summarized at a high level,
recoded, or injected with error in these public use files (see
more discussion below).
In some instances, an organization restricted access to a
subset of variables that could be linked to their public use
microdata set because these variables were considered par-
ticularly vulnerable to confidentiality risks. About half of
our respondents noted that analysis often required informa-
tion that was not provided on the public use microdata file,
and attempts were made to “accommodate” the research
needs of analysts.18
Fifty percent of the organizations reported linking their
survey data to administrative data. Administrative records
were generally of three types: health, earnings, and school
transcripts. From the few responses that described linking
practices, it appears that organizations often used social
security numbers to link administrative records. In the re-
leased data, the social security numbers were then sup-
pressed and replaced with a newly created unique identifier
to link administrative records to survey data. Organizations
were, however, much more likely to restrict access to linked
administrative data than to longitudinal data. For example,
arrest history data were considered to provide various dis-
closure risks, and, consequently, were never publicly re-
leased.
Contextual and geographic data present similar disclo-
sure risks because there is potential identification of specific
small localities. In some cases, the two types of data were
collected longitudinally, so the categories of “at-risk” data
overlapped. All of the longitudinal microdata surveys in-
cluded some geographic or contextual data in their public
release versions; however, geographic data were generally
confined to state or census division identifiers.19 The orga-
nizations were reluctant to release detailed geographic or
contextual data in the public use microdata files because of
confidentiality concerns.
SDL procedures were applied to two variables that were
identified as contributing to increased disclosure risks,
“age” and “income” (n 5 14 data sets). Treatment of these
special “at-risk” variables varied widely by organization.
There were different levels of detail at which age was
available (e.g., day, month, and year of birth; month and
year of birth; or year of birth sometimes given as age in
years) and whether birth year was top or bottom coded.
Three of the data sets top coded age (or bottom coded birth
year), following guidelines proposed by statisticians at the
U.S. Census Bureau.20 Nonetheless, some organizations did
not top code age, and their longitudinal panel studies now
have sample persons who constitute the “very old,” of more
than 100 years old. Two levels of detail were reported for
income (e.g., exact values of income were available or
income was collapsed into categories), and top coding was
applied by most organizations, although the level at which
income was top coded varied widely by organization. The
most strict standard was top coding the top three percent of
income; the most liberal standard was top coding income
above $9,999,999.
Some of the organizations reported masking other sen-
sitive data that were particularly relevant to their microdata
set, including race, ethnicity, rare health status, and educa-
tional attainment. Race groups might be collapsed into
broad categories because there were few members of some
racial groups in the survey or a rare mortality event might be
recoded to protect these particularly sensitive health data.
One respondent noted that “industry and occupation” codes
“might be limited.” Still another respondent commented
that “marital history” data “provided a serious disclosure
risk,” but did not indicate why these data were unusually
sensitive or whether the organization had established a
policy to limit the risk.
Our discussions with respondents revealed that some-
times data were “masked” to facilitate data collection or
storage, rather than because of concerns about confidenti-
ality. For example, parental income was collected categor-
ically in surveys administered to adolescents because ado-
lescents might not know their parents’ exact income. In
some cases, age was top-coded at “99” because a two-digit
field was allocated to age for data storage. An unintended
18 These organizations created files with more detailed information that
contained either the entire set or a subset of the original data, which might
contain social security identifiers, complete address information, and vari-
ables that derive from administrative record keeping systems. One orga-
nization developed a “research file” that was a subsample of records
“created in a synthetic way by swapping and combining information from
different records,” which could be used by analysts to test their programs
and carry out preliminary analysis from their work place. The analyst’s
request was then submitted through a “secure” Internet server for the
complete data set, the request was vetted by the organization to ensure that
confidential information was not included in the output, and the output was
returned as an encrypted file to the researcher. More generally, however, if
restricted access to the more comprehensive set of data took place, it was
through contractual agreement.
19 The principal difference between the restricted access and public use
data was that considerably more detailed contextual/geographic data ap-
pear in the restricted access file (e.g., census geocode or county identifiers,
block and tract numbers). For example, some organizations released cate-
gorical county unemployment rates on their public use files and continuous
county unemployment rates on their restricted access files.
20 Based on federal agency guidelines that derive from work carried out
at the U.S. Bureau of the Census, age may not be revealed for the top 3%
of persons age (U.S. Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology, 1999).
Thus, for example, the age of respondents in Census Bureau surveys cannot
be older than 88 years at any time during the length of a panel. The “year
of birth” is bottom coded to 1912, and age is recalculated for the public use
files. Thus, for example, any person who is over 88 years or will age to
891 from 1998–2000 is assigned a birth year of 1912, and will age from
84 to 88 years over the life of the panel.
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consequence of these data collection and storage decisions
was that data were masked.
Longitudinal data received the least attention of the “at-
risk” categories of data. These data, some containing as
much as 30 years of observations, were not considered to
present special disclosure risks. The timing of data release
led to variation in the SDL techniques applied to microdata
sets. SDL standards have been modified over time, with
fewer restrictions applied during the 1970s and 1980s than
during the 1990s. Relatively liberal release policies for
longitudinal data appeared to be, at least in part, a function
of the amount of time between release of base-line and
follow-ups data files. Decisions about earlier data releases
did not appear to play a role in the decisions about what to
release in the longitudinal files. Issues related to deductive
disclosure have been brought to the attention of staff only in
recent years, resulting in stricter standards for releasing
public use files. The result is that older longitudinal micro-
data sets face special risks to deductive disclosure. Earlier
data releases may contain more detailed information about
respondents than would be released under current practices.
Furthermore, because the data sets follow respondents over
long periods of time, they contain a wealth of detailed
information. The combination of changing SDL standards
and the compilation of data on respondents over time may
make older longitudinal data sets particularly vulnerable to
disclosure. It is, however, the longitudinal data that span
decades that often makes these microdata sets particularly
useful to researchers.
How Respondents Assessed Disclosure Risk
As data producers, our SDL respondents were familiar
with the broad issue of “data confidentiality.” They were
concerned about protecting the identity of respondents in
the surveys they conducted and knew that direct identifiers
of their respondents should not be released. The participants
in our SDL study knew that name, address, and social
security number were unique identifiers and had to be
deleted and that income was a sensitive variable. They
understood that age or date of birth needed to be masked in
some way, and either deleted these and other variables in the
public use files or restricted access to the data. Furthermore,
nearly all the organizations did not publicly release geo-
graphic or contextual data for small areas because of con-
cerns about data confidentiality. Similarly, linked adminis-
trative data were often confined to restricted access data.
Overall, however, the SDL respondents appeared unfa-
miliar with research on statistical disclosure risk or disclo-
sure limitation methods and data confidentiality terminol-
ogy. With two exceptions (see below), respondents applied
simple rules for masking sensitive data in cross-sectional
files. Assessment of disclosure risk on the data set was not
actually carried out. Most of our respondents in university
and private-sector organizations applied practical solutions,
“rules of thumb,” to decisions about what variables to
suppress. Government agencies either followed established
guidelines or deferred to a formal organizational unit re-
sponsible for making decisions about releasing public use
data and applying SDL techniques; one of our respondents
commented that he did not know how these officials reached
a decision about which data to mask or suppress.
Only two organizations reported that they had conducted
disclosure risk analysis to determine the best way to ensure
the confidentiality of the respondents prior to issuing a
public use file, and only one of them had performed risk
analysis on longitudinal files similar to the NELS example
earlier in this article. Most organizations appear to have
based their SDL decisions for public use longitudinal files
on the cross-sectional files. That is, with one exception, they
assessed the risks of disclosure on the cross-sectional rather
than longitudinal files. For example, they did not alter their
policy about releasing geographic/contextual data for lon-
gitudinal data sets; in other words, all of the panels of
longitudinal surveys contained the same geographic/contex-
tual data. This could increase the risk of deductive disclo-
sure for respondents who moved; in two cases, however, in
one organization, this risk had been anticipated and geo-
graphic/contextual data were available only in the baseline
public use files but omitted from later panels.
These differences across organizations appear to be real,
because those who received the questionnaire had been
identified by members of their own organization as the
person most knowledgeable about data confidentiality is-
sues. There appeared to be greater variation in knowledge of
data confidentiality standards and disclosure risk in univer-
sities than in government agencies.21 Those university-af-
filiated respondents who demonstrated the most knowledge
about SDL techniques were members of survey research
organizations that have long been involved with govern-
ment agencies through, for example, contractual agreements
for data collection, processing, or the production of public
use files. These same survey research organizations had also
employed statistical consultants to guide them in modern
SDL practices, and practiced a “layers of access” approach,
which represented protections for human subjects, for the
organization, and for researchers both on and off site.
The Exigencies of Organizational Life: Interactions of
Structure, Technology, and Environment
The respondents in our survey are members of large-
scale organizations that are loosely integrated and operate in
a highly decentralized environment, with structural units
segregated one from another along functional lines of re-
sponsibility. Both the internal and external enviroment ex-
ercise enormous constraints over the introduction of new
information into work practices.
21 This assessment of the limited knowledge of disclosure risk was also
confirmed by another participant in the CNStat workshop who has over-
seen the archiving of thousands of data sets for more than 30 years.
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Structure and Technology
Control over the life cycle of data is complicated by the
loose coupling of units responsible for data collection
through data distribution. Responsibilities are typically par-
titioned according to the task to be performed: data design,
collection, processing, linkage and merging, public use file
creation, documentation, and distribution.
Thus, for example, instruments for collecting data were
designed in offices distinct from the field units that collected
the data. These two offices were also separated from data
processing units responsible for preparing data for public
use files and/or for analysis. Analysts to whom the data files
were distributed conducted their work independently from
the units that collected and processed the data files. Further-
more, these operations could be overseen by different units
of the same organization or by different organizations. Their
respective activities may or may not have been documented;
and communication between and among the units might be
rather limited, take place infrequently, or not at all.
The structurally differentiated data production life cycle
also interacted with project management control, which we
found differed across organizations and units. Some project
managers were familiar with the nuts and bolts of data
release decisions, while others were not. Rare was the
situation where one principal investigator or project director
was responsible for all aspects of the life cycle of data.
There was also staff turnover during the lifetime of the
longitudinal surveys, and several respondents reported that
they were “new on the job.” Herbert Simon (1991) has
noted that institutional memory, in the form of memoranda
and other written materials and human capital, is a critical
resource for organizations. However, our survey found that
historical records or project decisions and the experiences of
long-tenured staff were not necessarily available to guide
these new entrants.
Thus, part of the explanation for the lack of knowledge
about SDL applied to longitudinal public use microdata files
may reside in the difficulties associated with coordinating
complex tasks in highly differentiated organizations whose
units are specialized, relying on different expertise and
abilities and employing different technologies to accom-
plish the daily work. Structural differentiation, and thus
different loci of responsibility, implied different interpreta-
tions of problems and possible courses of action and, very
important for managing and communicating information, of
the difficult task of coordination.
Pressure from the External Environment
The social world of our respondents could be described
as the “constancy of constantly changing conditions.” We
found that the external environment—the policy process
and demands from users—had effects on the behavior of
our respondents, intensifying their uncertainty and increas-
ing the ambiguity that they experienced. The external po-
litical world was perceived as “in flux” and threatening
because of the contending interests of different stakeholders
in the system. Policies governing data access and confiden-
tiality were subject to change; and the only certainty was
that enacted legislation would have an impact on the func-
tioning of their organizations. Legislative initiatives, which
are responses to public concerns about confidentiality, were
seen as potential threats to public use data.
Staffs were highly sensitive to the consequences of re-
leasing data that could identify individuals. Interpretations
of these data confidentiality policies influenced decisions
about the release of public use microdata. One of our
statistical agency respondents noted, for example, that his
organization’s preparation of a public use file had ceased
because of a recently enacted statute, which they interpreted
as preventing the distribution of public use data from their
survey. Their caution was not unique, whether or not they
properly interpreted the statute. What is important is the
perceived threat from the external environment that resulted
in restricting important data.
Knowledge of data user behavior also influenced deci-
sions about release policies for longitudinal data. Staff were
sensitive to the fact that data users find longitudinal data
particularly useful when they contain measures of the same
variables over time, and are very aware that their data would
be more useful if they provided more detail in their public
use microdata sets. As a result, for example, these organi-
zations made an effort to release the same data in every
panel.
One respondent made this tension clear when he stated
that his organization increased data availability because of
the demands of data users. The level at which income was
top-coded was increased by one organization because data
users complained about the lack of data on high incomes. A
respondent noted that,
We have received strong feedback from potential users
regarding the importance of having state identifiers on the
file. Therefore, rather than deleting state of residence alto-
gether from the file [because a combination of state and site
identifiers may have populations that are small], we have
masked state of residence in the two sites where these
problems exist, through use of a “data switching” proce-
dure. This involves switching the state of residence for a
portion of cases within these sites.
This respondent acknowledged that this switching intro-
duced some measurement error for analysis at the state level
or when secondary data were merged, but argued that the
effect was “unlikely to have any significant effect on results
at the national population analysis.” Users were informed
that data “switching” had taken place, but the data file
documentation did not disclose the extent.
Other respondents implied that decisions to release data
were based, in part, on providing as much data as possible
to researchers. Public use data were “advertised” on Web
sites by highlighting their detailed and longitudinal con-
tents. This advertising is designed to increase use of these
data and to demonstrate to program funders that the data
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distribution function is being performed. Technological
change, particularly by providing easy access to public data
and statistical software through the Internet, added to these
pressures to make data available to researchers. While tech-
nology facilitated the research process it also increased the
risk of deductive disclosure through the availability of pub-
lic data stored at Web sites.
In summary, perception of an external environment with
contending interests and improved access because of tech-
nological change created uncertainties about their appropri-
ate responses and reinforced the ambiguities and dilemmas
of law and policy. Respondents had to weigh the usefulness
of their data against the need for data confidentiality when
they made decisions about the release of public use micro-
data. They thus practiced a balancing act to reconcile com-
peting directives, “deploying strategies to cope with the
clash between prescriptions” of law and policy and the
unpredictability of the political environment (Brown & Du-
guid, 1991, p. 4).
Discussion: Locating Explanation in Theories of
the Social Life of Organizations
Research in many different settings demonstrates un-
equivocally that organizations and their cultures, structures,
and environments matter for getting the daily work done.22
These investigations into organizations with complex tech-
nologies, conducted over more than 4 decades, and theory
derived from this empirical work support our assessment
that the social context of the data producing organizations
constrained the search for new information by the respon-
dents in the SDL practices survey and impeded the diffusion
of innovative statistical disclosure limitation practices. The
large body of empirical evidence on institutions and orga-
nizational decision making, including research on commu-
nities of practice, organizational learning, and the diffusion
of innovation, yields understandings about why the organi-
zational practices we observed do not reflect the idealized
view of the “knowing organization” that uses expertise,
information, and knowledge, “so that it is well informed,
mentally perceptive, and enlightened” (Choo, 1998, p. xi).
The potency of structure and its interaction with culture
and the environment, as well as its effects on communica-
tion processes, is understood from, for example, the early
work of organizational theorists (Emory & Trist, 1965; Hall,
1972; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Pugh, 1973; Selznick,
1949; Thompson, J.D., 1967a, 1967b; Thompson, V.A.,
1977; Thompson & Bates, 1957; Woodward, 1958). Their
studies laid the foundation for empirical research that relied
on an open systems approach and brought into sharper focus
the role of the environment in corporate and public sector
settings and its contributions to public policy decisions and
organizational learning (e.g., Alford, 1975; Feldman, 1989;
Hall & Quinn, 1983; Meyer & Scott, 1983; Pheffer &
Salancik, 1974, 1978; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; Rob-
bin, 1984; Scott & Christenson, 1995; Scott et al., 1994;
Wildavsky, 1979).
A variety of empirical investigations carried out in dif-
ferent settings demonstrate how organizational culture,
structure, and the environment interact to create inter- and
intraorganizational communication failures and limit peo-
ple’s search for information. The analyses of Weick (1990)
and Vaughan (1996) of the Tenerife air disaster and the
Challenger disaster, respectively, show that work practices
contributed to horrendous technology disasters that were a
consequence of inadequate or miscommunication. Robbin
(1984) and Sasfy and Siegel (1981a, 1981b) found that the
highly bureaucratic decision making structures of state
agencies and perceptions of the external environment
strongly influenced decisions that staff made to release or
deny access to administrative records containing confiden-
tial information. Chatman’s (1999) study shows how the
walls of a state prison constrain the world view of its
women inmates. Organizational hierarchies influenced how
information systems were designed and later implemented
(Kling & Jewett, 1995; Kling, Kraemer, Allen, Bakos, Gur-
baxani, & Elliott, 1996; Napier & Smith, 2000). History and
work practices were critical factors in the development of
the International Classification of Disease (Bowker & Star,
1999).23
Evidence of the effects of organizational culture and
structure on communication in the production of data also
comes from work by Robbin and Frost-Kumpf (1997), who
investigated two longitudinal data systems and found that
the complexity of organizational, social, and technical pro-
cesses introduced error that found its way into public use
data files. Errors occurred because each of the units that
participated in data production had its own base of author-
ity, power, and discretion, with its own complex set of rules,
procedures, and understandings about the data and how they
would be collected, processed, and used. The administrative
complexity of record keeping practices and the length of the
communication chain for the data production process con-
tributed to interorganizational failures in the transfer of data
and information across the government agencies that these
researchers examined.
Knowing and learning are dependent on the social con-
text in which the daily work takes place, and it is this
context that formed the “community of practice” of the22
“Culture“ is broadly defined to include both collective memory and
individual biography. Orr’s (1990, p. 169) definition of “community mem-
ory,” as she applies it to the world of her photocopier repair technicians to
the larger institutional or organizational setting, is extended to “culture.”
“Community memory” refers to “those things known in common by all or
most competent members of the technician community, the working set of
current knowledge shared among technicians.” Rule structures, for exam-
ple, are part of institutional memory.
23 Other research includes learning to navigate ships (Hutchins, 1990,
1991, 1996); the delivery of medical care (Cicourel, 1990); the slow
response to the AIDS epidemic (Perrow & Guillen, 1990); managerial
decision making in Canadian banks (Beck & Moore, 1985); and transpor-
tation and nuclear energy industrial accidents (Perrow, 2000).
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respondents in our SDL survey (Chaiklin & Lave, 1996;
Lave, 1988; Lave & Wenger, 1991). Thus, to understand
impediments to organizational learning and the introduction
of innovation into organizational practices, we need to ex-
amine “the context of the community in which the [tasks
take place and tools] are used and that community’s partic-
ular interpretive conventions,” that is, “the practices and
communities in which knowledge takes on significance-
”(Brown & Duguid, 1991, pp. 12–13), because cognition is
is socially situated and ”progressively developed through
activity” (Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989, p. 3).
Communities of practice create, organize, sustain, and
reproduce what they know through their daily work. The
organizations that our respondents worked in created the
ways of communicating about their life worlds and the
enterprise in which they were engaged (Brown & Duguid,
1998; Wenger, 1998). Explained theoretically in the context
of failures in communicative practices in work life,
Hutchins (1996, p. 52) comments that, “Lines of commu-
nication and limits on observation of the activities of others
have consequences for the knowledge acquisition process.”
The exigencies of work and politics shaped information
search and use of the research literature on SDL methods by
the survey respondents, “filter[ing] out what [was] included
and excluded in the calculus of decision” (Weick, 1995, p.
57), to produce that “boundly rational” worker described by
Simon. In the context of their organizations, how the data
production process was organized “influenced what type of
information was available” (Feldman, 1989, p. 144).
The work culture of their community of practice rein-
forced practical ways of solving problems that ignored
available information in order to reduce complexity and, at
the same time, reduced the search for innovative solutions.
They applied “rules of thumb” and protocols or deferred to
a superior or formal rule-making, relying on rule structures,
in the form of statutes, policies, regulations, and standard
operating procedures that defined how to get the job done
and what constituted permissible, defensible, or acceptable
behavior. In other words, they created, reproduced, and
legitimated existing social and political arrangements.
These regulatory mechanisms reinforced the “satisficing”
behavior that Simon (1997) describes.24
Yet it must also be recognized that there was little
organizational slack to engage in information searching.
Projects continually competed for attention, and there was
never enough time. Not conducting a search of the literature
on SDL methods or not incorporating new knowledge into
the decision process for issuing public use microdata files
was a rational response “when time or information-process-
ing constraints limit to a few cues or variables the amount of
information which can be processed” (Inbar, 1979, p. 17).
Herbert Simon’s principle of “satisficing” and his observa-
tion about the “limited information processing” capability,
so fundamental to designing information systems, applied to
our respondents.
Nonetheless, this explanation remains incomplete if we
attribute all decision making to the constraints of rule struc-
tures and limited information processing ability. Decision
making is not only a product of an organization’s social
history, but also of the particular biographies of its mem-
bers. As we learned from the SDL survey, knowing how to
apply normative rule structures for preserving data confi-
dentiality also depended on who was on what job and for
what length of time. Membership certainly carries with it
“its attendant world-views,” Weick (1997, p. 399) remarks,
but these can be modified by personal history. Put another
way, the life cycle of data reflected the life history of the
organization, but this history was not independent of the
biographical experiences of its members, the “practical in-
terests, perspectives, and interpretive practices of the rule
user” (Zimmerman, 1970, p. 223; see also Blumer, 1969;
Garfinkel, 1967).
In summary, the work culture of our respondents pro-
vided disincentives to search for innovative solutions to the
difficult problem of releasing public use longitudinal micro-
data files. Decision making was not a straight-forward ap-
plication of the rules that governed the respondents’ daily
life. Institutional history, including the life cycle of data
production for longitudinal microdata, introduced multiple
accounts, confusion, and contradiction. Cues from the ex-
ternal environment were also confusing and contradictory,
as our respondents noted when they discussed the effects of
new legislation and the pressures to release data to research-
ers. As such, there remained sufficient ambiguity in the
daily life of our respondents to create uncertainty, to permit
discretion in decision making, to require adjudication be-
tween divergent assumptions and competing values and
norms, to negotiate meaning, and to induce variation into
organizational practices (March & Olsen, 1976; Robbin,
1984).
Coda on Theoretical Explanation and Policy
Implications
Our project began as a small, exploratory survey to
determine what statistical disclosure limitation methods
were applied by organizations that produced public use
microdata files containing longitudinal, administrative, and
contextual data. The survey originated out of concern that
“an effective governmental statistical system,” which de-
pends on “data that society collects and maintains about
itself, its institutions and its citizens” (Duncan & Pearson,
1991b, pp. 237–238) requires a knowledge base about how
24
“Satisficing” refers to how alternatives are evaluated before a deci-
sion is made. Simon’s seminal article, ”A Behavioral Model of Rational
Choice” (1955), argued that the conception of “Rational Man“ was not an
accurate description of how people made decisions; indeed, it was “incom-
patible with the access to information and computational capacities that are
actually possessed by organisms, including man . . .” (p. 7) People do not
have a “well-organized and stable system of preferences” (p. 10), or are
they able to evaluate all alternatives and reach the optimal solution. Rather,
in “complex choice situations,” they simplify in order to make a choice to
“find an approximate model of manageable proportions” (p. 10) and choose
the first satisfactory alternative; in other words, they “satisfice.”
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well statistical solutions are being applied to reduce disclo-
sure risk.
At the outset of our project, the staff responsible for the
SDL survey assumed that the corpus of research and infor-
mation about good practices had been communicated to
organizations responsible for the production of public use
longitudinal microdata files. Research into disclosure risk
had been conducted for more than 25 years, and many
journal articles had been published on the subject. Statistical
agencies had also offered guidelines for good practice that
are circulated throughout the federal government and pub-
lished at government web sites. Informational materials and
workshops are also available through professional associa-
tion like the American Statistical Association (American
Statistical Association, 1999a, 1999b). Yet, the responses to
the SDL survey questionnaire and the follow-up conversa-
tions revealed that many of the respondents did not know
the language and application of SDL methods.
The findings concerning SDL practices were unexpected
and subsequently propelled a search for explanation. An
intensive review of the original responses and the follow-up
interviews with our respondents provided insights into a
host of factors that appear to have contributed to their lack
of familiarity with statistical disclosure risk for longitudinal
microdata files. The practices that the survey respondents
engaged in were a consequence of common-sense judg-
ments, tacit, taken-for-granted understandings, practical
reasoning, and the routinized procedures of every day work
life. Through their accounting practices, respondents made
visible the social order of institutions and organizations,
“an understanding of the lived experience” (Holstein &
Gubrium, 1994, p. 262). History and politics left their
imprints on these organizations and on the practice of pro-
ducing public use files. The SDL work setting was itself a
community of practice whose members experienced failures
in communication and information exchange.
Redefining the findings from the SDL survey more gen-
erally as a problem of decision making in large-scale, com-
plex organizations locates explanation for impediments to
organizational learning and communication of new knowl-
edge as a function of structural and technological complex-
ity and the interactions between organizations and their
environments. Redefining work life inside these organiza-
tions as a “community of practice” also provides insights
into the problems of translating the research of statisticians
into the practices of a community of nonstatisticians who
are engaged in the release of public use longitudinal micro-
data files and into the policy solutions that flowed from our
discovery.
We discovered that the properties of organizations, in-
cluding their structures, environments, and meaning sys-
tems, contributed to or impeded knowledge use about dis-
closure risk and SDL methods associated with longitudinal
microdata. These properties had significant effects on infor-
mation production, coordination, and communication, as
well as on the acquisition of new knowledge from outside
the work unit and organization.
The theoretical lens of “communities of practice” illu-
minates our understanding of the seeming deficits in the
knowledge (and therefore language) of SDL concepts and
terminology of our respondents, and also makes explicit
why they ignored a large formal literature on statistical
disclosure limitation methods. Employing a more nuanced
language of explanation, Brown and Duguid (1991, p. 12)
suggest that we understand the respondents’ SDL practices
as a consequence of “a wide range of materials that include
ambient social and physical circumstances and the histories
and social relations of the people involved.”
The policy problem is how to ensure that already avail-
able knowledge of the community of practice of statisticians
is incorporated in the corpus of knowledge of the commu-
nity of practice of data producers and distributors and how
to create effective communication channels for knowledge
use to take place. The policy solution is to improve and
institutionalize the communication of information on how to
appraise and treat statistical disclosure risk and to make data
managers more competent and effective.
The “community of practice” theoretical perspective also
offers a policy solution for actively engaging the partici-
pants in microdata public use file production in a search for
new knowledge—as in Lave’s (1998, p. 6) articulation of
the nature of social relations and context: “Participation in
everyday life may be thought of as a process of changing
understanding in practice, that is, as learning.” Social par-
ticipation is constitutive of learning and knowing. Extend-
ing Lave’s and others’ conceptions of communities of prac-
tice to conceptualize organizations as “social networks of
learning” (see, for example, Pesconsolido & Rubin, 2000;
Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996) also yields a policy
recommendation to engage the various types of expertise
needed for assessing disclosure risk and applying appropri-
ate solutions. That very old notion of the role of a “boundary
spanner” can also be usefully resurrected (Allen, 1970; for
recent treatments that situate boundary spanning in the
communities of practice school, see Albrechtsen & Jacob,
1998; Davenport & Hall, in press; Jacob & Albrechtsen,
1997). Boundary spanners can potentially solve the problem
of heterogeneous communities of practice—social worlds
each with their own linguistic traditions that impede com-
munication—and help construct a “common ground” for
shared communicative environments (for achieving “com-
mon ground” see Clark, 1985; Krauss & Fussell, 1991).
Conceptualized as choice between competing values and
contending interests of stakeholders, the problem for our
SDL respondents is: how to adjudicate, balance, and recon-
cile abstract, ambiguous, and contradictory public policies
on privacy, confidentiality, and records release to carry out
policy and social research in an unpredictable world. One
consequence of ambiguity and uncertainty in this terrain of
action is, however, that there are usually multiple reper-
toires available for negotiating, reconciling, or achieving
provisional consensus about the problematic status of these
rule structures (see March & Olsen, 1989, pp. 21–22).
Ambiguity conceived as opportunity implies that the terrain
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can also be a source of innovation (Kruskal, 1981, p. 513).
Critical, then, for our respondents is deciding which cues to
attend to, to help them make sense of the situation and to be
“inventive [and] ‘ignore precedent, rules, and traditional
expectations’ and break conventional boundaries” (Brown
& Duguid, 1991, p. 17, also quoting Orr, 1990).
Conflicts in the “ground rules” will always engender
cross pressures that are unavoidable. The complexity of this
political environment will result in administrative solutions
that deny or restrict access to data for social research. But
these cross pressures are not necessarily a liability. They can
lead to creative solutions that utilize a knowledge base of
substantial research on statistical disclosure risk and statis-
tical disclosure limitation methods, so that both data access
and data protection remain privileged values. In other
words, cross pressures are also opportunities for organiza-
tional learning. The work setting does not foreclose impro-
visation or a search for solutions to reconcile the competing
values. Indeed, developing administrative procedures for
conditions of restricted access can be viewed, along with
other practices, as innovative solutions to reduce risk and
the dilemmas that our respondents faced.
Personal information is the lifeblood of organizations. It
is a knowledge asset, extraordinarily valuable for the con-
duct of government, corporate, and scientific life. Govern-
ments require personal information to administer programs,
provide services, and ensure accountability. Business firms
rely on personal information to manage transactions with
customers, conduct research to increase market share, and
identify potential customers of their products. Schools and
health care providers rely on personal information on stu-
dents and patients to assess progress and provide appropri-
ate services. Research on human subjects and businesses, as
well as many other entities, often requires access to indi-
vidually identifiable information.
Nonetheless, information privacy has become a very
important and high-profile policy issue because of the very
large amount of personal information collected by public
and private sector organizations. The public debate is, how-
ever, principally about how personal information will be
used. In the end, the contentious debate about the intrusive-
ness of the 2000 decennial census subsided when citizens
understood that their information was a critical information
resource for distributing federal funds to their communities
(Lott, 2000). Moreover, although public opinion surveys
indicate that people exhibit anxiety about information pri-
vacy, their concerns reflect a lack of confidence in the
private sector’s promises to safeguard personal information.
They remain very enthusiastic about the benefits of infor-
mation technology (Pew Research Center, 1999) and cau-
tiously willing to share information on-line (McGuire,
2000), recognizing the utility of a transaction that ex-
changes personal information for desired services.
The scientific discourse about personal privacy that re-
volves around the production and release of statistical data
is a subset of this larger policy debate about information
privacy, one that addresses the cross pressures of maintain-
ing confidentiality and ensuring access. As with all other
public policy issues, there are important moral and ethical
issues that figure in the calculus of and trade-offs between
efficiency and effectiveness, and these cannot be ignored.
These contradictory impulses are critical to understand for
their policy implications, and the scientific community must
be sensitized and respond to them in appropriate ways.
Although the technical issue of public use microdata file
release is far less visible, it, too, warrants public discussion.
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Appendix 1. SDL Organizational Practices Survey
Questionnaire
[Note that this is a facsimile of the questionnaire. In the
original questionnaire, the font size is at 12 point and space
was left between each question.]
Workshop on Confidentiality of and Access to
Research Data Files
National Academy of Sciences
Instructions
Please record your answers in the format most convenient
for you: on this form, in an attachment if responding by
e-mail, or on separate sheets. Use the question numbers to
identify answers. To save your time, if there is documenta-
tion available that answers some questions, please include it
with your response and refer to the relevant documents in
your answers to the questions.
A. Identification
1. Name of survey:
2. Agency or organization:
3. Respondent
a. Name and title:
b. Contact information:
B. Substantive Questions
1. Please provide or refer to a brief description of the
survey, covering its purposes, content, and design.
2. How many public-use microdata files based on this sur-
vey have been released or are expected to be released by
the end of 1999? (Note: If the answer is none, please
discuss briefly why you have not released any public-use
files and stop here.)
3. For each file released, what units do the records refer to
(e.g., persons, families, households, establishments)?
(Some files may include more than one type of unit. List
all that apply.)
4. For each file released, which of the following kinds of
data does it contain: longitudinal data, linked administra-
tive data, contextual data for small areas? (Note: If none
of the files contains any of these kinds of data, stop here.
You may want to discuss briefly your reasons for not
issuing any public-use files with these kinds of data.)
Questions 5, 6, and 7 refer to longitudinal, linked ad-
ministrative, and contextual data, respectively. Answer
only those questions that apply to one or more of your
public-use microdata files. (Note: We understand that you
may not wish to provide full detail on masking and other
procedures used. If so, please indicate that some details
have been excluded.)
5. Longitudinal data
For what kinds of units are longitudinal data included in the
files, e.g., persons, households, families, establishments?
What are the main categories of data and some of the key
variables for which longitudinal data are included in the
file, and what are the reference dates or periods for these
variables?
Which of these variables were considered to present special
disclosure risks and what masking or other procedures
were used to reduce these risks to an acceptable level?
If age was a variable, how was this dealt with for successive
time periods?
Were some variables that were included in one or more
cross-sectional files excluded from longitudinal files? If
yes, what kinds of variables?
Were there any special problems associated with persons or
households that moved between waves of the survey or
entered or left the sample for other reasons?
How were these dealt with? How much geographic detail
was included in the files? Was this less than that included
in cross-sectional files?
6. Linked administrative data
For what kinds of units are linked administrative data in-
cluded in the files, e.g., persons, households, families,
establishments?
What agencies or organizations provided the administrative
data and what specific administrative record databases
were used?
How were the administrative data linked to the survey data,
e.g., using SSNs or other numerical identifiers, using
name and address, etc.?
What match rates were achieved?
What are some of the key variables for which linked admin-
istrative data are included in the file, and what are the
reference dates or periods for these variables?
Which of these variables were considered to present special
disclosure risks and what masking or other procedures
were used to reduce these risks to an acceptable level?
What procedures were used to prevent the supplier of the
administrative data from being able to reidentify individ-
ual units in the public-use file containing the linked ad-
ministrative data?
7. Contextual data (data on the characteristics of political
subdivisions or other geographic areas in which the sample
units are located)
What kinds of areas were contextual data included in the
public-use microdata file(s)?
What kinds of variables were included for these areas and
how much detail for each one? (If possible, provide a list)
What precautions were taken to ensure that users would not be
able to use these variables to identify areas not explicitly
identified in the file(s)?
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Please mention any other issues concerning statistical dis-
closure limitation procedures used for these files that you
think might be of interest for this study? For example, we
would be interested in knowing how you chose the partic-
ular masking or other methods you use from among the
range of alternatives available.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION!










01 Public use Restricted access Public use
02 Public use Restricted access Public use
03 Public use None Public use
04 Public use Public use Public use
05 Public use Public use Public use
06 Public use None Public use
07 Public use Restricted access Public use
Restricted access
08 Public use None Public use
09 Public use None Restricted access
Restricted access
10 Public use Restricted access Public use
Restricted access
11 Public use None Public use
Restricted access
12 Public use None Public use
Restricted access
13 None None Public use
14 Public use Restricted access Public use
Restricted access
15 Public use Public use Public use
16 Public use Restricted access Public use
Restricted access
17 Public use None Public use
18 Public use None Public use
19 Public use None Public use
20 Public use Public use Public use
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